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On April 13, 2010, Nebraska enacted a new state ban on abortion in the Pain-
Capable Unborn Child Protection Act that has caught the attention of many on both sides 
of the abortion debate,
1 and has inspired other states to attempt similar measures.
 2 The 
statute requires the referring or abortion-providing physician to make a “determination of 
the probable postfertilization age of the unborn child” (defined as, “the age of the unborn 
child as calculated from the fertilization of the human ovum”) and makes it illegal to 
induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion upon a woman when the “probable 
postfertilization age” of the fetus is “twenty or more weeks” unless the doctor determines 
in “reasonable medical judgment (1) she has a condition which so complicates her 
medical condition as to necessitate the abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or to 
avert serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily 
function or (2) it is necessary to preserve the life of an unborn child.”
3 It also offers a civil 
action to the father of the unborn child, its grandparents, or the woman for “knowing or 
reckless violation of the act for actual damages,” as well as providing for injunctive 
relief.
4 
  The Act offers a new theory to make these abortions illegal: fetal pain. As its 
legislative findings the bill states that:  
 
(1) At least by twenty weeks after fertilization there is substantial evidence that an 
unborn child has the physical structures necessary to experience pain; (2) There is 
substantial evidence that, by twenty weeks after fertilization, unborn children seek 
to evade certain stimuli in a manner in which in an infant or an adult would be 
interpreted as a response to pain; (3) Anesthesia is routinely administered to 
unborn children who have developed twenty weeks or more past fertilization who 
undergo prenatal surgery; (4) Even before twenty weeks after fertilization, unborn 
children have been observed to exhibit hormonal stress responses to painful 
stimuli. Such responses were reduced when pain medication was administered 
directly to such unborn children; and (5) It is the purpose of the State of Nebraska 
to assert a compelling state interest in protecting the lives of unborn children from Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805904 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805904 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805904
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the stage at which substantial medical evidence indicates that they are capable of 
feeling pain.
5 
 
The Act went into effect on October 15, 2010, and potentially provides judges already 
inclined against the abortion right a new doctrinal basis to bypass or supplant existing 
constitutional precedent. It differs from previous abortion laws that have made reference 
to fetal pain, such as the “partial birth abortion” ban at issue in Gonzales v. Carhart,
6 in 
that it seeks to prohibit any abortion procedure on the ground of fetal pain, rather than 
restrict women to particular forms of abortion less likely to cause fetal pain.
7 Proponents 
of the law perhaps anticipated an immediate legal challenge, but may also hope it could 
ultimately make it to the Supreme Court where it would provide the Roberts’ Court an 
opportunity to rewrite the Court’s abortion jurisprudence. 
  In this paper, we briefly review the existing constitutional focus on — and 
problems with — the viability construct and we further argue that although the question 
is a novel one with few clear precedents, the best reading of the existing Supreme Court 
case law is that even if fetal pain exists at 20 weeks postfertilization — itself a 
speculative claim — that should not suffice to make this new statutory prohibition on 
abortion constitutional.  
 
Existing Constitutional Doctrine and the Trouble with Viability 
 
To appreciate the novelty of and challenges posed by the Nebraska statute, it is useful 
first to understand the existing doctrinal focus on viability. Although Roe v. Wade is 
commonly associated with the trimester framework it introduced, it is also the origin of 
the Supreme Court’s tying of the state’s ability to prohibit abortion to the viability of the 
fetus:  
 
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, the 
‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has 
the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation 
protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and biological 
justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may 
go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to 
preserve the life or health of the mother.
8 
 
As Justice O’Connor made explicit in her 1983 dissenting opinion in City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., under this rationale “[a]s medical science 
becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point of 
viability is moved further back toward conception,” such that, with each advancement in 
neonatology that pushes viability earlier in gestation the set of abortions the state can 
constitutionally prohibit grows.
9 In its 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 
Supreme Court expressly rejected the trimester framework in favor of treating viability as 
the primary dividing line, intoning that “there is no line other than viability which is more 
workable,” as the point at which the state’s interest in preserving fetal life becomes 
compelling and overrides the mother’s interest in procuring an abortion.
10 The court also Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805904 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805904
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acknowledged that the viability line then stood at 23 or 24 weeks by last menstrual period 
(LMP).
11  
  Thus, as constitutional doctrine now stands, the state can only prohibit abortion 
outright (eliminating some methods such as “partial birth abortion” is another matter
12) 
when the fetus is considered viable.  
  Unfortunately, the concept of viability itself remains subject to confusion.
13 Like 
the Supreme Court, our societal normative tendency has been to assign a cut-off for fetal 
viability based on estimation of gestational age alone; however, we now know that other 
factors such as sex, birth weight, and maternal exposure to steroids affect probabilities of 
long-term neonatal survival.
14 Other things being equal, extremely premature female 
newborns generally have better survival odds than their male counterparts. More 
importantly, clinical definitions of viability reflect a complex amalgam of prevailing 
medical and socio-cultural attitudes of a particular society; thus, in the U.S. and the U.K., 
few neonates are resuscitated below 23 weeks gestation by LMP, whereas in the 
Netherlands, that age rises to 25 by LMP.
15 By contrast, in Japan, more neonates born 
above 22 weeks by LMP are resuscitated.
16 Regardless of threshold, because in aggregate 
so few neonates are resuscitated at or near 20 weeks “postfertilization” anywhere in the 
world (22 weeks by LMP), we do not really know how many of those extremely 
immature neonates could survive.
17 The most reliable available published data suggests a 
survival to discharge range between 1% and 20%.
18  
  Working clinical definitions of viability involve human interpretation of statistical 
probabilities that are typically applied to a class of about-to-be-born fetuses. That is, they 
are not individual patient-specific, and as such, also likely (and in some cases 
subconsciously) represent a collective consensus about scarce resource allocation. As our 
chances of success diminish, it becomes less compelling to offer an intervention. Long-
term survival data alone is not all that informs collective viability thresholds; a heavy 
majority of survivors born below 23 weeks gestation by LMP will sustain significant 
permanent cognitive and physical disabilities and this no doubt affects our interpretation 
of where to draw the line. 
  The fact that different viability thresholds exist in different regions of the world 
let alone different regions within the United States suggests that conscientious people 
might reasonably disagree about what percentage chance of survival (with or without 
long-term disabilities) is sufficient to warrant an attempt at newborn rescue. Put 
differently, given what data we possess on mortality and morbidity for extremely 
premature neonates, few obstetricians or neonatologists would advocate that we create a 
uniform policy of attempting resuscitation on every fetus born at or above 20 weeks 
postfertilization (using the Nebraska statutory language).   
  In the abortion context, we suggest that legislative attention on viability 
potentiates a false sense of “fetal security” which can be illustrated by putting the new 
Nebraska law into operation. Imagine two pregnant women at an Omaha clinic who both 
desire an abortion but who do not qualify for the highly restrictive medical emergency 
exception. Both women are determined by LMP to carry fetuses at 22 weeks and five 
days with a reasonable margin of error of plus or minus five days (note: even this degree 
of precision is often not available). Both women are told the provider is outlawed from 
performing the procedure. The first women leaves discouraged. The second woman, after 
the shock of hearing the news, goes into active, uncontrollable labor and within an hour   4 
proceeds to deliver an extremely premature newborn. The woman decides the best thing 
for her child, given such long odds, is to direct care toward maximizing comfort and 
ensuring dignity during the dying process. This palliative choice is respected by her 
providers because in the U.S. pediatrics community, there is generally consensus that 
neonates born below 23 weeks by LMP should not be resuscitated given their poor 
chance of survival without significant disability. 
We highlight this clinically asymmetric outcome to emphasize that legally 
constructed thresholds of viability, while in the Supreme Court’s mind the only 
“workable” solution, should not be mistaken to ensure some absolute protection for 
about-to-be born fetuses. In practice, fetuses that cannot lawfully be aborted because they 
have just barely crossed a legislatively determined definition of viability are routinely and 
intentionally allowed to die shortly after birth despite having a small statistical chance of 
survival. At least theoretically, this does provide a loophole (albeit unattractive, much 
like back alleys) for pregnant women, who cannot obtain an abortion at or beyond 20 
weeks post-fertilization but who also do not desire to have a child, to self-induce 
extremely premature labor and only present to the hospital when it is beyond the point of 
controlling and immediate delivery is required. 
The normative question that logically follows from the law’s continued 
endorsement of viability as the basic trigger for restricting a woman’s abortion right is 
whether we then ought to restrict parental liberty to refuse potentially life-sustaining 
therapy (or provider discretion to offer the same) for a baby born who is possibly viable 
based on the legislative definition. Nothing is mentioned in the Nebraska law about 
potential obligations of physicians poised to attempt a neonatal resuscitation in cases of 
birth at or just after 20 weeks postfertilization (22 weeks by LMP). The statute does, 
however, discourage any prenatal actions that have “an intention other than to increase 
the probability of a live birth,” or “to preserve the life or health of the child after live 
birth.”
19  
   
 
The State’s New Interest in Preventing Fetal Pain 
 
Although the Supreme Court has said that the preservation of fetal life becomes 
compelling only at the viability point, it has not said this can be the state’s only 
compelling interest and it has said nothing about fetal pain at all. Nebraska appears to 
have capitalized on this gap and in its statute declares: 
 
It is the purpose of the State of Nebraska to assert a compelling state interest in 
protecting the lives of unborn children from the stage at which substantial medical 
evidence indicates that they are capable of feeling pain.
20 
 
In so doing it has set up a novel legal question: is an abortion prohibition premised on 
preventing fetal pain constitutional? By drawing a line at 20 weeks postfertilization age, 
the Nebraska statute rather conveniently presents this question as to a fetus with a 
presumptive low probability yet some possibility of viability. However, we note that the 
statute appears to assert a compelling state interest in preventing pain that could permit   5 
the state to ban abortions of fetuses even if there is no chance of viability. Is this move 
constitutional? 
  There are at least two variants of the argument one might construct for the 
Nebraska statute’s constitutionality: (1) the prevention of pain in itself is a compelling 
state interest sufficient to allow the state to prohibit abortion at any stage where the fetus 
will feel pain (call this the “pain standing-alone argument”); (2) while preserving fetal 
life is not a compelling state interest until the viability point, the state’s interest in 
preserving fetal life of a not-yet-viable fetus becomes compelling when we add the 
prevention of fetal pain on to it, thus two state interests not compelling standing alone 
may be compelling when added together (call this the “combination argument”). We 
focus on the latter because it is stronger. Both of these arguments are to be contrasted 
with an argument that would seek to use fetal pain to limit the types of abortion one can 
perform on already-viable fetuses, such as “partial birth abortion” bans. 
  The Nebraska statute might be read as offering as its constitutional ground either 
the “pain standing-alone” or “combination” argument. An earlier draft of the legislation 
more strongly suggested the pain standing-alone argument, with a now-omitted 
legislative finding that “[t]here is a valid state interest in reducing or preventing events in 
which pain is inflicted on sentient and nonsentient creatures. Examples of laws that serve 
this interest are laws governing the use of laboratory animals, laws requiring pain-free 
methods of slaughtering livestock, and laws regarding hunting methods on federal 
lands.”
21 Thus, as originally drafted, rather than carving out a special exception for 
preventing human fetal pain, the statute explicitly compared it to the pain felt by other 
“sentient creatures.”
22 
  This version of the argument may be susceptible to the objection that it proves too 
much. Its logic suggests that the government should also be able to outlaw all forms of 
hunting, all forms of not-painless animal experimentation, and all forms of animal 
consumption that do not involve painless methods. To the extent one might claim any of 
those activities were protected by a fundamental substantive Due Process constitutional 
right, on the rationale of the Nebraska statute those rights too are defeated by the state’s 
compelling interest in pain-prevention. If any of those activities were protected by 
something less than a fundamental right, as seems plausible, then the conclusion follows 
a fortiori if the pain standing alone argument is correct. That is, if the prevention of pain 
to a sentient creature is enough to justify infringing on what is avowedly a fundamental 
right of women to have an abortion, it should plausibly justify infringing on a right 
receiving less constitutional protection. Because the structure of this objection to this 
version of the argument is a reductio ad absurdum, its force depends on the absurdity of 
the conclusion to which the argument leads; that is, if one thought that the state could in 
fact consistent with the Constitution outlaw all forms of hunting, all forms of not-painless 
animal experimentation, and all forms of animal consumption that do not involve painless 
methods, then this implication of the pain standing alone argument should not be 
troublesome. If, however, the constitutionality of those kinds of hypothetical laws seems 
implausible, so should the pain standing-alone argument. 
  In any event, the more sophisticated version of the argument — the combination 
argument — sidesteps this objection altogether, because it does not claim that preventing 
any pain to sentient creatures qualifies as a compelling state interest sufficient to trump 
an existing fundamental right, but instead, only pain to human fetuses in whom the state   6 
has a growing but not-yet compelling state interest before viability. One could also 
sidestep this objection by offering a reconstruction of the pain standing-alone argument 
that sought to limit itself to fetal pain but did not attempt to combine the argument with 
the state’s pre-viability interest in preserving fetal life, call this the “fetal pain standing- 
alone” argument. Such a reconstruction would have to show why pain to human beings, 
standing alone, mattered from a constitutional vantage point while pain to non-human 
animals did not. We do not dwell on this possible reconstruction because we think it is 
less persuasive than the combination argument and, in any event, all of the arguments we 
now offer against the combination argument apply equally well to it.  
  As a reason to uphold the Nebraska statute as constitutional, we think the more 
sophisticated combination argument is problematic for at least three reasons: 
  First, the available scientific evidence to date does not support the Nebraska 
legislature’s claim that “substantial medical evidence” could support a conclusion that 
fetuses at 20 weeks postfertilzation age are “capable of feeling pain.”
23 Indeed, the best 
available evidence remains a systematic multidisciplinary review published in JAMA in 
2005, in which the authors conclude: 
 
Pain is an emotional and psychological experience that requires conscious 
recognition of a noxious stimulus. Consequently, the capacity for conscious 
perception of pain can arise only after thalamocortical pathways begin to function, 
which may occur in the third trimester around 29 to 30 weeks’ gestational age, 
based on the limited data available. Small-scale histological studies of human 
fetuses have found that thalamocortical fibers begin to form between 23 and 30 
weeks’ gestational age, but these studies did not specifically examine 
thalamocortical pathways active in pain perception. While the presence of 
thalamocortical fibers is necessary for pain perception, their mere presence is 
insufficient — this pathway must also be functional. It has been proposed that 
transient, functional thalamocortical circuits may form via subplate neurons 
around midgestation, but no human study has demonstrated this early 
functionality.
24 
 
Importantly, no new revelatory scientific insights have been published since 2005 to 
challenge the authors’ findings at the time.
25 Thus, while it may be accurate for Nebraska 
to find that some of the anatomic structures within the developing nervous system are 
present in a normally developed fetus at 20 weeks postfertilization gestation, it is 
misleading to suggest this physical reality is sufficient for a fetus to “experience” pain. It 
is further misleading to suggest that observable neuroendocrine, metabolic, and reflexive 
responses to stimuli are equivalent to meaningful pain perception. Each of these later 
responses can be elicited even in the absence of nociception and none require 
consciousness.
26 
  To avoid both a tautological misstep and clinical tomfoolery, experts on pain 
physiology agree that subjective experience is necessary for any definition of pain, and 
they distinguish nociception from the personal experience of pain.
27 In clinical terms, it is 
difficult to see a benefit in giving morphine to a patient who happily and honestly tells us 
with a smile on her face that she feels no pain despite us also recognizing that some of   7 
her neuro-sensory pathways are being stimulated by our procedure. This remains true 
even if the patient is in the dying process.  
  Second, if the presence of fetal pain is what causes the state’s interest to become 
compelling, then if that pain can be prevented the interest should cease to carry much, if 
any, weight. Given that there are good reasons to doubt whether borderline viable fetuses 
possess anything beyond basic nociception, it is not surprising that we have little 
evidence to support any kind of routine practice regarding optimal fetal analgesia. 
Nebraska legislators engage in faulty inferential thinking when they rely on findings that 
“[a]nesthesia is routinely administered to unborn children who have developed twenty 
weeks or more past fertilization who undergo prenatal surgery” and that “hormonal stress 
responses to painful stimuli [exhibited by unborn children] were reduced when pain 
medication was administered directly to such unborn children” as further evidence that 
fetuses feel pain.
28 In 2001, an authoritative textbook on fetal surgical therapy stated that 
the need for and “benefit of fetal anesthesia” during operative procedures performed in 
utero “has not been documented.”
29 Similarly, the 2005 JAMA review co-authored by a 
leading expert on fetal anesthesia notes: 
 
Surgical procedures undertaken for fetal benefit use anesthesia to achieve 
objectives unrelated to pain control, such as uterine relaxation, fetal 
immobilization, and possible prevention of neuroendocrine stress responses 
associated with poor surgical outcomes. Thus, fetal anesthesia may be medically 
indicated for fetal surgery regardless of whether fetal pain exists.
30 
 
 
Still, even if we assume for argument’s sake, that a pre-viable fetus’ potential capacity for 
nociception carries any risk of conscious pain perception, there is no reason to question 
that this sensory experience could be sufficiently and adequately blunted with the 
appropriate use of standard narcotic analgesics, just as it is done every day in thousands 
of operating rooms around the United States with infants, children, and adults undergoing 
surgical procedures.
 That abortion providers have historically not thought to provide fetal 
analgesia (for the defensible reasons discussed above) does not mean they could not do so 
in the future if abortion remains a constitutionally protected right. To put this point in 
constitutional law parlance,
 31 the Nebraska statute is not narrowly tailored to the 
(purported) compelling state interest in preventing pain if it also outlaws abortions where 
such pain can be prevented. This alone seems constitutionally fatal. 
Perhaps one might respond that we are subtly misconstruing the statute, that the 
bill’s title suggests what Nebraska is claiming is that the capacity to feel pain is itself a 
criterion of constitutional personhood, such that pain-capable fetuses are constitutional 
persons. A similar claim has on occasion been made as a theory of personhood from an 
ethical standpoint, at least as to some rights associated with personhood.
 32 Such an 
approach would suggest that a fetus’ capacity to feel pain at a given age should render it 
protected from abortion whether or not it actually feels pain in the abortion process; to 
put the point another way, to say that pain-capable fetuses deserve constitutional 
personhood is roughly equivalent to saying that the state has a compelling interest in 
preventing the termination of pain-capable fetuses before viability, whether or not those 
fetuses actually experience pain through the abortion procedure. Shifting to the capacity 
to feel pain as the constitutionally relevant fact would enable defenders of the statute to   8 
escape our point about fetal analgesics, for even if the fetus will actually feel no pain 
during the abortion, it is its status as a pain-capable entity that renders the abortion 
problematic. However, this defense of the statute also comes at a cost: it threatens to 
return us to the reductio discussed above in that it would also suggest that animals who 
can feel pain should also qualify for constitutional personhood at least as to being killed, 
unless one could offer a constitutionally relevant “non-speciesist” (to use Peter Singer’s 
term)
 33 further distinction between fetuses and animals. This argument would also 
require breaking with prior Supreme Court precedent suggesting that only at the viability 
point does the state's interest in the preservation of fetal life become compelling. In any 
event, even if defenders of the Nebraska statute (or future legislatures) were to adopt this 
approach, it would leave intact our other two critiques of the statute. 
  Third, and finally, even if fetal pain is both real and unavoidable, it is not clear 
that fetal pain should get the constitutional weight the Nebraska statute purports to attach 
to it.
 The claim of the argument is that prevention of pain to a legal non-person is enough 
when added to the state’s interest in the preservation of fetal life to outweigh a woman’s 
“right not to be a gestational parent” stemming from the protection of bodily integrity.
34  
  As we have noted, as a pure doctrinal matter the Supreme Court has yet to address 
whether the state’s interest in preventing fetal pain in combination with its interest in 
preserving the life of a not-yet-viable fetus constitutes a compelling state interest capable 
of overcoming a woman’s fundamental right(s) protected by free abortion. Thus, we 
emphasize, the Supreme Court could uphold the Nebraska statute on this ground without 
having to explicitly overrule prior precedent. Still, to the extent that determination will in 
part depend on a normative analysis of the conflicting interests, there is good reason to 
think that while fetal pain may be relevant, it ought not to be dispositive on the issue.  
  Of course, there are many normative theories of the abortion right, some of which 
view it more as a balancing approach to moral values in conflict while others view it as 
an aspect of one’s right to bodily integrity, and we do not purport to examine what each 
would say about fetal pain. Instead, we concentrate on one particularly influential defense 
of the abortion right offered by Judith Jarvis Thomson.
35 
   Thomson offers a famous hypothetical meant to elicit the view that the right not to 
be a gestational parent — that is, the abortion right — ought to attach even if we granted 
fetal personhood. She asks us to imagine a woman who finds herself attached (though no 
fault of her own) to a famous violinist as a human dialysis machine, and is told that if she 
disconnects herself before the end of nine months, the violinist will die.
36 If we think the 
woman has the right to “disconnect” herself, then that suggests that abortion ought to be 
lawful even if a fetus is a person, since the violinist is no doubt a person.  
  Now imagine we make explicit what might be thought implicit in Thomson’s 
hypothetical: the violinist will suffer significant pain due to the disconnection. Does it 
make a difference as to our view of whether the woman may disconnect herself, as 
compared to the case where disconnection will result in the violinist’s painless death? If it 
is not dispositive, then this once again suggests that the addition of fetal pain should not 
automatically trump the exercise of a woman’s abortion rights, even for those who think 
fetuses are persons. 
  Extending Thomson’s thought experiment can usefully distinguish the 
permissibility of considering fetal pain as a reason to make illegal certain types of 
abortion rather than to prohibit abortions altogether. If there existed two ways of   9 
detaching the violinist, one excrutiatingly painful to him and one painless, the state might 
be justified in allowing only the painless method even if that method imposed some 
burdens on the woman seeking to disconnect (exactly how much of a burden, being, of 
course, contentious). That conclusion does not, however, tell us that the presence of fetal 
pain is dispositive as to the question of whether the woman can disconnect at all. It is our 
(admittedly rebuttable) claim that most of us share the intuition that the individual should 
have the disconnect right in such a case even if it causes pain.  
  Some object to Thomson’s argument that unlike for the violinist, the woman bears 
responsibility for her fetus — presuming she engaged in consensual sexual intercourse — 
and that this ought to alter our reckoning of her moral (and perhaps legal) duties, while 
others disagree.
37 For present purposes, resolving this dispute is of secondary importance; 
what matters is seeing that whichever way one resolves the dispute adding the additional 
fact of pain does not force a conclusion.  
  In conclusion, the Nebraska statute seems designed to target an open question in 
American constitutional jurisprudence: whether the presence of fetal pain can (standing 
alone or in combination with other interests) constitute a compelling state interest 
justifying prohibitions on abortion before viability. We have tried to construct the most 
favorable arguments for upholding the constitutionality of the Nebraska statute and 
subject them to careful examination. While we have concluded that the statute fails to 
meet that challenge and should be found unconstitutional, we think that the question is 
closer than defenders of the abortion right might like. More generally, we believe that 
there are genuine grounds to debate the extent to which and why the willful destruction of 
biological organisms (human or otherwise) should or should not be legal, and public 
debate oftentimes amplifies deeply held disagreements about which social, cultural, and 
religious values people think ought to be prioritized. While the Nebraska statute may 
have the more narrow aim of tempting predisposed federal judges to disregard Roe and 
other settled precedent, we hope that our reflections on the statute’s constitutionality and 
normative justifiability can help further the larger debate in more measured and nuanced 
terms.  
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